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EUROPEAN LAW
DEFINING THE FAMILY AND THE SCOPE
OF PROTECTION AVAILABLE - TENSIONS
BETWEEN NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Louise Crowley*
R~sum
La Cour europ~enne des droits de l'homme est un forum actif en mati~re d'examen
des plaintes individuelles contre les gouvernements dans le domaine des droits
individuels et familiaux. I1 reste qu'en d~pit des progr~s ind~niables r~alis~s tant
sur le plan du droit domestique que du droit europ~en, la d~f~rence a la marge
d'apprciation des Ltats signataires a &6 pr~pondrante dans ce secteur
particuli~rement sensible du droit. Cela provoque des tensions continues entre les
positions de juridictions locales et les inclinations souvent (mais pas toujours) plus
lib~rales de la Cour europ~enne des Droits de l'Homme. Le present texte analyse
ces questions A travers les exemples du changement de sexe et des relations
homosexuelles.
I INTRODUCTION
Family law is an especially organic and evolving area of law; reacting as it must
to social change but nonetheless operating within the confines of the social and
cultural norms of each jurisdiction. It is arguable that in the context of
regulating the family, law is used less as a social tool utilised to direct individual
choices and rather more typically as a regulatory framework to identify and
protect the rights of a social unit or units, as individual and social choices
evolve, making it reactive rather than proactive in approach. In terms of scope,
the concept of the family and the protections afforded to the family by any state
is typically limited by the parameters placed by individual states on its
definition and composition. Traditionally many states deliberately limited the
scope of the concept of family, mandating a particular structure and
composition in order for it to come within the remit of the protections offered.
Historically, differences have always existed between individual states as to the
accepted norms in this sphere, but progressive shifts in respect of the changing
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shape and definition of families and the associated development of individual
and family unit-based rights have been addressed to different degrees in most
states. Against this backdrop the European Court of Human Rights has served
as an active forum for the identification and consideration of individual
grievances against governing regimes, in respect of the vindication of individual
and/or family-based rights. However, despite the unquestionable progress that
has been made at domestic and convention level, the over-riding deference to
the margin of appreciation of signatory states in this especially sensitive area of
governance can still result in remaining tensions between the jurisdiction-based
regulatory approaches and the typically (but not always) more liberal
inclinations of the European Court of Human Rights.
II DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ART 8 OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights has demonstrated a growing acceptance
of the multiple formulations of family to which the Art 8 Convention rights
may apply, continuing the shift away from the more traditional construct of the
family, historically expected to be premised upon a marital union, and typically
with children. This broadening of the application of the Art 8 right to respect
for one's private and family life has been evident in a number of recent cases,
some related directly to the scope and definition of the familial relationship,
and others more broadly linked to the notion of private life. However, as a
collective it is reasonable to surmise that these decisions of the Court reflect a
further and developing willingness to continue to extend the reach of Art 8
protection.
In Fernandez Martinez v Spain,' the complainant priest, an employee of the
state, had been working as a religious education teacher for 7 years on the basis
of renewable annual contracts. Privately, he lived as a married priest, with five
children. The case arose from the decision of the Ministry of Education, under
the direction of the diocese where he worked, to refuse to renew his contract; he
claimed that this was in light of his personal circumstances becoming widely
known through media exposure. Fernandez Martinez sought to rely upon the
protections afforded by Art 8, claiming that the non-renewal of his employment
contract had occurred as a direct result of the personal choices he had made in
his private and family life. The European Court of Human Rights found in his
favour, regarding 'private life ... [as] ... a broad term not susceptible to
exhaustive definition', 2 and deeming Art 8 to be applicable to the case. It
regarded the refusal to renew the contract as constituting interference with the
exercise by the complainant of his right to respect for his private life.
Application no 56030/07 Judgment of the Grand Chamber 12 June 2014.
2 Paragraph 109; relying upon Schuth v Germany no 1620/03 ECHR 2010, stating that it would
be 'too restrictive to limit the notion of "private life" to an "inner circle" in which the
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the
outside world not encompassed within that circle'.
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'Restrictions on an individual's professional life may fall within Article 8 where
they have repercussions on the manner in which he or she constructs his or her
social identity by developing relationships with others. In addition, professional
life is often intricably linked to private life, especially if factors relating to private
life, in the strict sense of the term, are regarded as qualifying criteria for a given
profession.'
The Grand Chamber took the view that 'as a consequence of the non-renewal
of the applicant's contract, his chances of carrying on his specific professional
activity were seriously affected on account of events mainly related to personal
choices he had made in the context of his private and family life' and thus it
followed that Art 8 was applicable. However, in adjudicating on the issue of
arbitrary interference, the Court noted that 'regard must be had to the fair
balance which has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of
the individual', noting the fact of the state's margin of appreciation in both
instances. 3 In applying these accepted principles to the facts of the case, the
complainant's awareness of his heightened duty to the church as an employee of
the state within the religious context was deemed to limit the scope of his right
to respect for his own private choices. The court was of the view that:4
'by signing his successive employment contracts, the applicant knowingly and
voluntarily accepted a heightened duty of loyalty towards the Catholic Church,
which limited the scope of his right to respect for his private and family life to a
certain degree.'
Thus, given that the applicant had knowingly placed himself in a situation that
was incompatible with the teachings of the Church, the Court concluded that
no violation had occurred in the circumstances.
Although unrelated to the definition or scope of the family per se, the decision
of the Court in Konovalova v Russia5 demonstrates a consideration of a
previously untested aspect of the concept of private life - notably the extent of
a patient's rights in the context of medical procedures, and in again stating that
'the concept of "private life" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive
definition', 6 it serves to highlight the obligation on signatory states to protect
individual rights of privacy; and in the instant case, the right of free and
informed consent in the patient-hospital relationship. The applicant challenged
the uninvited presence of medical students at the birth of her child,
notwithstanding that she was attending a public hospital and was informed in
advance, via information booklet, of the possibility of their presence. After the
birth she claimed that their attendance without her express consent in advance
had constituted a breach of her rights under Art 8. The Court found in her
favour, declaring:7
3 Paragraph 114.
4 Paragraph 135.
5 Application no 37873/04; judgment delivered 9 October 2014; rectified 21 November 2014.
6 Paragraph 39. The court noted that Art 8 covers, amongst other things, information relating to
one's personal identity, such as a person's name, photograph, or physical and moral integrity.
7 Paragraph 41.
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'that given the sensitive nature of the medical procedures ... the fact that the
medical students witnessed it and thus had access to her confidential medical
information ... there is no doubt that such an arrangement amounted to "an
interference" with the applicant's private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the
Convention ... '
and thus there had been 'an interference' with her right to respect for her
private life. The fact of an established legal basis for the interference, Art 54 of
the Russian Health Care Act, did not legitimise the interference, as the Court
regarded the statutory provision as having failed to 'contain any safeguards
capable of providing protection to patients' private lives' as necessary.8
The interesting related judgment of the Court in Dubska and Krejova v Czech
Republic9 considered the scope of the contracting states' margin of appreciation
in respect of the compliance of domestic legislation with Art 8 obligations.
Acknowledging the sensitivities associated with the process of giving birth, as
per the case of Konovalova v Russia, the Court noted in particular the
important related issues of physical and psychological integrity, medical
intervention, reproductive health and the protection of health-related
information. Consequently, as a matter of definition, the Court was satisfied
that decisions relating to the circumstances of giving birth do fall within the
scope of the mother's private life for the purposes of Art 8. However, the issue
before the court in Dubska and Krejova v Czech Republic, ie the prohibition
under Czech law preventing health professionals from assisting with home
births, was deemed to be a matter within the scope of the wide margin of
appreciation afforded to signatory states and could not be regarded as placing
an unlawful disproportionate or excessive burden upon the applicants.
Certainly in allowing for this margin of appreciation, the Court relied upon
what it considered to be the lack of European consensus on the issue of
facilitating home births as a matter of policy.
More directly relevant to the concept and definition of family is the recent
decision of the Grand Chamber in Hamalainen v Finland'° where the issue of
gender identity in the sphere of family life was considered. The applicant had
undergone male-to-female gender reassignment surgery and issued the
complaint because she was unable to record her new gender without either
securing a divorce against her wife or alternatively transforming the marriage
into a same-sex registered partnership. Neither was possible in the
circumstances: the former because it would go against their religious conviction
and the latter because her spouse would not consent to the transformation of
their relationship status. The applicant claimed that, by forcing her to take one
of these actions in order to record her new identity, her right to private and
family life, as guaranteed under Art 8, was violated. The decision of the Grand
Chamber not to find in her favour was not surprising in light of previous
8 Paragraphs 43-44.
" Applications nos 28859/11 and 28473/12.
10 [2014] ECHR 787. Application no 37359/09. Judgment of the Grand Chamber delivered 16
July 2014.
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decisions in similar cases, bowing to the need for a margin of appreciation to be
afforded to signatory states, given that the case 'raises sensitive moral or ethical
issues', 1 as well as the absence of a European consensus on permitting
same-sex marriages and the related lack of governing regulations of marriages
where one party has undergone gender reassignment. From a comparative
perspective and in an attempt to identify any level of consensus amongst the
member states of the Council of Europe, the Court noted as follows:
1 2
'From the information available to the Court, it would appear that ... twenty-four
member States (Albania, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia) have no
clear legal framework for legal gender recognition or no legal provisions which
specifically deal with the status of married persons who have undergone gender
reassignment. The absence of legal regulations in these member States leaves a
number of questions unanswered, among which is the fate of a marriage concluded
before gender reassignment surgery. In six member States (Hungary, Italy, Ireland,
Malta, Turkey and Ukraine) relevant legislation on gender recognition exists. In
these States the legislation specifically requires that a person be single or divorced,
or there are general provisions in the civil codes or family-law provisions stating
that after a change of sex any existing marriage is declared null and void or
dissolved. Exceptions allowing a married person to gain legal recognition of his or
her acquired gender without having to end a pre-existing marriage exist in only
three member States (Austria, Germany and Switzerland).
... It would thus appear that, where same-sex marriage is not permitted, only three
member States permit an exception which would allow a married person to gain
legal recognition of his or her acquired gender without having to end his or her
existing marriage. In twenty-four member States the position is rather unclear,
given the lack of specific legal regulations in place.'
As regards the extent of the signatory states' duty to give effect to their positive
obligations under Art 8, given the sensitivities surrounding the issue for
consideration, and the need to strike a balance between competing private and
public interest of Convention Rights, the Court accepted the need for a wide
margin of appreciation in the particular circumstances. 13
'In the absence of a European consensus and taking into account that the case at
stake undoubtedly raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the Court considers that
the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must still be a
wide one ... This margin must in principle extend both to the State's decision
whether or not to enact legislation concerning legal recognition of the new gender
of post-operative transsexuals and, having intervened, to the rules it lays down in
order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests.' 14
' Paragraph 67.
12 Paragraphs 32-33.
13 Paragraph 67, citing Frettg v France and others Application no 36515/97.
14 Paragraph 75. The court in this paragraph relied upon the previous ruling in X, Y and Z v
United Kingdom Application no 21830/93 (1997).
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An additional factor hindering the strength of the applicant's claim that her
rights under Art 8 had been breached related to the fact of her remaining
options, in particular the capacity for her to convert her marriage into a
registered partnership, a status that already operated to protect same-sex
couples in a manner very similar to marriage. On this point, the differences
between marriage and registered partnership were not deemed sufficient to
amount to a failure on the part of the Finnish legal system to act:' 5
'In the Court's view, it is not disproportionate to require, as a precondition to legal
recognition of an acquired gender, that the applicant's marriage be converted into a
registered partnership as that is a genuine option which provides legal protection
for same-sex couples that is almost identical to that of marriage (see Parry v The
United Kingdom (dec)). The minor differences between these two legal concepts
are not capable of rendering the current Finnish system deficient from the point of
view of the State's positive obligation.'
Another recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of
Art 8 arises from the related cases of Mennesson v France16 and Labass~e v
France'7 which concerned a claim of interference first in relation to respect for
the collective family life of surrogate parents and their twin daughters; and
secondly relating to the twins' right to respect for their private lives. The cases
centred on the refusal by the French authorities to recognise the parentage of
the applicant twin girls, born as the result of a surrogacy arrangement entered
into in California. The applicants sought to register their familial parent-child
status in France, having already secured US birth certificates identifying the
French couple as the parents of the two girls, following a judgment of the
Californian Supreme Court. The parents were unable to register the birth of the
girls in the French Civil Register because surrogacy is prohibited under French
law. The Court of Cassation in France rejected the applicants' case on the basis
that surrogacy is unlawful and is contrary to French law and public policy.
The European Court of Human Rights commenced its judgment by declaring it
to be satisfied that the complainants Mr and Mrs Mennesson had cared for the
children since birth and they had lived together as a family in France for 10
years, being 'brought up there by genetic and intended parents in a de facto
family unit in which [they were receiving] affection, care, education and the
material welfare necessary to their development'. 18
On the first issue, by way of preliminary point, the Court noted that it was not
in dispute between the parties that the refusal by the French authorities to
legally recognise the family tie between the four applicants amounted to an
interference in their right to respect for their family life, and thus it was simply
s Paragraph 87. Thus the court concluded that no violation could be declared. Of note of course
is the subsequent change in governing Finnish regulation, with same-sex marriage to become
lawful in Finland in 2017.
16 Application no 65192/11.
17 Application no 65941/11.
18 Paragraph 26, quoting from the observations of the Advocate-General, although his opinion
was not followed by the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division) 6 April 2011.
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for the Court to determine the lawfulness of that interference. Such interference
would be regarded as a breach of the rights guaranteed by Art 8 of the
Convention 'unless it is justified under paragraph 2 of that Article as "being in
accordance with the law", pursuing one or more of the legitimate aims listed
therein, and being "necessary in a democratic society" in order to achieve the
aim or aims concerned'. 19
On the first issue requiring that the interference must be 'in accordance with the
law' the Court explained that not only does this mandate that the measure in
question must have a basis in law, but also that it must be accessible to the
person affected and be foreseeable as to its effects in order to permit the person
to regulate his or her behaviour as necessary. 20 The court was satisfied that the
interference was in fact in accordance with law, on the basis of the evidence
adduced and the applicants' associated failure to support their assertion that a
more liberal practice had previously existed in France regarding the recognition
of a surrogacy arrangement. As regards the legitimacy of the refusal to
recognise the existence of a valid legal familial relationship, the Court noted the
lack of a consensus in Europe on the lawfulness of surrogacy arrangements and
on the legal recognition of the relationship between the intended parents and
the child or children conceived abroad:21
'A comparative-law survey conducted by the Court shows that surrogacy is
expressly prohibited in fourteen of the thirty-five member States of the Council of
Europe - other than France - studied. In ten of these it is either prohibited under
general provisions or not tolerated, or the question of its lawfulness is uncertain.
However, it is expressly authorised in seven member States and appears to be
tolerated in four others. In thirteen of these thirty-five States it is possible to obtain
legal recognition of the parent-child relationship between the intended parents and
the children conceived through a surrogacy agreement legally performed abroad.
This also appears to be possible in eleven other States (including one in which the
possibility may only be available in respect of the father-child relationship where
the intended father is the biological father), but excluded in the eleven remaining
States (except perhaps the possibility in one of them of obtaining recognition of the
father-child relationship where the intended father is the biological father) ...'
The lack of a consensus was not a surprise to the court, given the 'sensitive
ethical questions' raised in this context and thus led the court to recognise the
need for a wide margin of appreciation in principle, both in relation to
authorising surrogacy arrangements and also recognising such arrangements
carried out in other jurisdictions. However, given the impact of the French
Government's refusal upon what the court regarded as 'an essential aspect of
1 Paragraph 50. The Court further noted that '[tihe notion of "necessity" implies that the
interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular that it is proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued...' citing reliance upon Wegner and JMWL v Luxembourg
Application no 76240/01 and Negrepontis-Giannisis v Greece Application no 56759/08.
20 Paragraph 57; citing relevant case law from the Court in support: Rotaru v Romania
Application no 28341/95 ECHR 2000-V and Sabanchiyeva and others v Russia Application no
38450/05 ECHR 2013.
21 Paragraph 78.
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the identity of individuals',22 it determined that in the present case the margin
of appreciation must be reduced. In respect of the claim by the four applicants
that the French laws failed to vindicate their right to respect for their family life,
the Court concluded that the applicants had not claimed that it had been
impossible for them to overcome the practical difficulties arising from the lack
of recognition of the legal parent-child relationship and were thus deemed to
have failed to demonstrate that they had been prevented from enjoying in
France their right to respect for their family life. 23 Thus the court agreed with
the findings of the Court of Cassation on this point, concluding that the
situation arising from the lack of French legal recognition of the parent-child
relationship 'strikes a fair balance between the interests of the applicants and
those of the State in so far as their right to respect for family life is concerned'. 24
The separate claim of a failure to respect the private lives of the third and
fourth applicants was however successful. The Court commenced this part of
its ruling by noting that 'respect for private life requires that everyone should be
able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which
includes the legal parent-child relationship ...; an essential aspect of the identity
of individuals is at stake where the legal parent-child relationship is
concerned'.25 The legal uncertainty for the third and fourth applicants arising
by virtue of the failure by France to recognise their legal relationship with their
parents was regarded as serving to undermine their identity in French society,
with the capacity to have 'negative repercussions on the definition of their
personal identity' as well as consequences for their inheritance rights. 26 In the
circumstances the Court unanimously ruled that2 7
'having regard to the consequences of this serious restriction on the identity and
right to respect for private life of the third and fourth applicants, that by thus
preventing both the recognition and establishment under domestic law of their
legal relationship with their biological father, the respondent State overstepped the
permissible limits of its margin of appreciation ... having regard also to the
importance to be given to the child's interests when weighing up the competing
interests at stake, the Court concludes that the right of the third and fourth
applicants to respect for their private life was infringed.'
The gradual expansion of the scope of the rights and the circumstances to
which they will apply arising under Art 8 and the associated willingness of the
European Court of Human Rights to narrow the margin of appreciation
afforded to signatory states was perhaps better evident in the 2014 judgment in
Jeunesse v the Netherlands.2 8 This case concerned a complaint by Jeunesse, a
Surinamese national who was illegally present in the Netherlands, having been
refused a residence permit although she lived there with her Dutch husband and
their three children and provided welcome clarification in respect of the scope
22 Paragraph 80.
23 Paragraph 92.
24 Paragraph 94.
2S Paragraph 96.
26 Paragraphs 96-97.
27 Paragraphs 101-102.
28 Application no 12738/10; judgment delivered on 3 October 2014.
Defining the Family and the Scope of Protection Available
of a signatory state's positive obligations to ensure respect for family and
private life under Art 8, arising in the context of immigration. Crucially the
court addressed the state's margin of appreciation given the fact of family life
being established, albeit during an illegal overstay, and the associated
obligations on the state vis-a-vis the children and the protection of their best
interests.
The applicant had outstayed a tourist visa and subsequently married a Dutch
national with whom she had three children. Despite numerous attempts the
applicant failed to secure a residence permit, primarily given her lack of a
provisional residence permit upon which to ground a successful application.
Before the Grand Chamber she sought to rely upon, inter alia, her rights arising
by virtue of Art 8; that the refusal by the Dutch authorities to issue her a
residence permit amounted to an infringement of her right to respect for her
family life. As a matter of process, the domestic practice, as evidenced in this
case, of requiring requests to be made from outside the receiving state, was
regarded by the Grand Chamber as entirely reasonable. In cases such as the one
at issue, where the applicant is part of an established family living with
nationals of that state, the Court stated that only in the most exceptional
circumstances would the removal of such an applicant be deemed incompatible
with Art 8. However such exceptional circumstances were deemed to exist in
the case presented by the applicant, the Court was satisfied that, upon
examining her circumstances cumulatively, the Dutch authorities had failed to
strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the complainant, her
husband and their children and their need to maintain their family life together
in the Netherlands and the competing interest of the state's public-order efforts
to control immigration. Ultimately the Court found in favour of the applicant,
concluding that:29
'national decision-making bodies should, in principle, advert to and assess evidence
in respect of the practicality, feasibility and proportionality of any removal of a
non-national parent in order to give effective protection and sufficient weight to
the best interest of the children directly affected by it.'
Thus whilst there remains significant domestic capacity to refuse applications
for residence notwithstanding evidence of family life, and Art 8 cannot serve as
a means to override domestic policies that greatly restrict the success of such
applications, where exceptional circumstances are presented, the European
Court of Human Rights can invoke Art 8 to protect the right to private and
family life.
Reliance upon Art 8 protections has more recently been accepted in respect of
the potential for family life developing at a future stage. The applicants in D
and Others v Belgium 30 challenged the time taken by the Belgian authorities to
provide them with the necessary travel documentation to allow a child born in
the Ukraine as the result of a surrogacy arrangement to return to Belgium with
29 Paragraph 120.
30 Application no 29176/13. Judgment delivered 8 July 2014.
The International Survey of Family Law
the applicants following his birth. The capacity to rely upon Art 8 was not
negatively affected by the fact that the parents and child had very limited
contact at the time of the hearing, and struggled to prove the fact of 'family
life'. The Court was satisfied that, in light of the extensive efforts of the parents
from the moment of birth to establish strong familial ties, an effective family
life had in fact existed and they were deemed entitled to invoke the protections
available under Art 8. In the circumstances however, the court was not satisfied
that the applicants had proven unreasonable delay and the complaint was
rejected as manifestly ill-founded. 31
Finally, as regards the scope and impact of Art 8, the European Court of
Human Rights also recently considered the scope of protection that can be
afforded to protect the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren.
In Kruskic v Croatia3 2 the first and second named applicants, the grandparents,
sought to challenge the decision of the domestic court to award custody of their
grandchildren to the children's father. Whilst the court accepted that Art 8
might be invoked successfully by grandparents, it stated that the relationship
between grandparents and grandchildren attracts a lesser degree of protection
and is different in nature from a parental/child relationship. Additionally,
although Art 8 can be successfully relied upon by grandparents in certain
circumstances, it cannot in its own right be regarded as conferring custodial
rights on grandparents. The complaint before the court in this case was rejected
as manifestly ill-founded, especially as the father had not renounced nor been
divested of his rights and responsibilities of parental care; and indeed the
domestic proceedings were ongoing. However, the capacity for Art 8 to apply
to protect the grandparent-grandchild relationship reflects an expanding view
of the scope of Art 8 protections and its capacity to protect parties in a
non-traditional family formation.
III EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF MARRIAGE -
MOVING TOWARDS THE ACCEPTANCE OF
SAME-SEX-MARRIAGE AS A RIGHT?
The capacity for parties to a same-sex partnership to secure protection under
the European Convention on Human Rights Art 8 guarantee of respect for
private and family life has been considered in a number of recent cases by both
the First Section Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights. In these cases, the Court has also considered the extent, if at all,
to which the guarantees under Art 12 (right to marry) and Art 14 (right to
non-discrimination) can be relied upon by parties in same-sex relationships
where they seek to vindicate their rights to equal treatment. Specifically the
cases before the courts have arisen in the context of the consideration of the
31 The child was born on 26 June 2013 and was not authorised to arrive in Belgium accompanied
by the applicants until 6 August 2013, following approval by the Brussels Court of Appeal for
the issuing of a travel document in the child's name.
32 Application no 10140/13. Judgment delivered on 25 November 2014.
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right to marry and the right to adopt and the recent rulings have demonstrated
that the international momentum is moving increasingly towards the
recognition of the equal rights of all couples, as regards both status and
substantive rights.
Whilst the European Court of Human Rights has not as yet recognised the right
to same-sex marriage nor has it identified any positive obligation on members
of the Council of Europe to afford and facilitate this right, recent case law
centring on the application and scope of the right to respect for private and
family life in this and related contexts continues with a progressive, less rigid
view of the notion of family, suggesting a gradual movement in that direction.
Recent applications to the court have relied as a starting point upon the
important decision of Schalk and Kopf v Austria33 where it was accepted by the
Court that same-sex partnerships may come within the 'protection of family
life' element of Art 8, an extension of the previously limited application of the
right to protection of the parties' 'private life' under Art 8. However, these
applications have sought to further extend that 2010 decision, and to limit or
indeed eliminate the generous margin of appreciation afforded to the Austrian
Government in that case. 34 The applicants in Schalk and Kopf v Austria sought
a progressive, contemporary interpretation of the Art 12 right to marry,
challenging the (then) Austrian statutory provisions which they claimed to be in
breach of their right to marry and additionally in breach of the Art 14 right to
non-discriminatory treatment in circumstances where the discrimination could
no longer be regarded as objectively justifiable in the circumstances. In calling
for a more liberal interpretation of the Art 12 right to marry, they sought to rely
upon what they identified as the existing international acceptance of the right
of same-sex couples to have their relationships recognised by law. However, the
Court pointed to the lack of a consensus amongst signatory states, noting that
at that time, no more than six of the 47 Convention states permitted same-sex
marriage. 35 Showing absolute deference to the individual signatory states' right
to govern in this sensitive area, the Court relied expressly upon Art 9 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to
determination of the scope of the right by individual national states which
provides that 'The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be
guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these
rights'. 36 This formed the basis for the Court's refusal to impose its own
judgment upon national authorities, who retain the right to regulate in such
matters in light of domestic norms and policies.
However, of note since this 2010 judgment are both the changing regulatory
frameworks in numerous signatory states as well as the related decision (both
3 Schalk and Kopf v Austria [2010] ECHR 995.
3' However, the potential scope and impact of this judgment was greatly lessened by the court's
ultimate reluctance to identify the fact of such a right, in light of the Court's acceptance of a
significant 'margin of appreciation' for individual signatory states in respect of the equal right
to marry, thereby limiting the impact of the extension of the application of Art 8.
31 Paragraph 57.
36 See www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text._en.pdf.
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delivered and pending) of the European Court of Human Rights. It is
interesting to track the slow but definite escalation in the number of states now
permitting same-sex marriage - not quite attaining consensus status yet, but
certainly moving in that direction. In addition to the ongoing attempts by
citizens, individually and collectively, to convince their domestic courts and
ultimately in some instances, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights, to progress the rights of same sex couples, the legislatures of
various jurisdictions, and in the case of Ireland, the citizens, 37 are in fact
making the most significant progress on this issue. Currently, 13 European
countries recognise same-sex marriage as lawful, namely Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland). 38
Finland and Ireland are the most recent additions to this list; Finland will give
effect to same-sex marriage in 2017. 3 9 Ireland has uniquely progressed its laws
by way of popular vote; with 60 per cent of those voting in a referendum on 22
May 2015 voting in favour of the re-definition of the right to marry to exclude
any distinction based on the gender of those entering the civil union. Upon the
passing of the Thirty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage
Equality) Bill 2015 the Irish Constitution will be amended to state as follows:
'Marriage may be contracted in accordance with law by two persons without
distinction as to their sex.' Further, the matter is far from stagnant in the
remaining jurisdictions; an additional 12 countries have a form of civil union or
unregistered cohabitation. A number of the jurisdictions that have sought to
maintain a distinction in respect of the status and rights of a different-sex
relationship and that of a same-sex relationship have been challenged before
both national courts and the ECtHR to varying levels of success, as set out
below. A related question still unanswered, but pending before the Court (and
set out below), is the lawfulness of excluding heterosexual couples from the
right to access civil partnerships.
As regards this contemporaneously developing case law of the European Court
of Human Rights, a number of recent decisions demonstrate a willingness on
the part of the Court to support this international liberalisation of laws. An
example is the recent decision in Vallianatos and others v Greece,40 where,
notwithstanding an acceptance of the lack of consensus amongst countries
within the Council of Europe, the Court recognised the increasing recognition
3 The majority of the Irish electorate voted in favour of amending the Irish Constitution on 22
May 2015 to a right to marriage equality, irrespective of the gender of the parties.
3 The Netherlands was the first European country to legally recognise same-sex marriage in
2001, followed by Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Norway (2009), Sweden (2009), Iceland
(2010), Portugal (2010), Denmark (2012), France (2013), England/Wales (2013), Scotland
(2014) and Luxembourg (2015). An additional 14 have a legally recognised form of civil union
or unregistered cohabitation.
3 In February 2015 the President of Finland has signed a law introducing equal marriage rights
following a narrow acceptance by the Finnish Parliament in November 2014. The law will have
effect from 1 March 2017.
40 Applications no 29381/09 and 32684/09; judgment delivered 7 November 2013.
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and regulation of same-sex relationships, in varying formats, including the right
to same-sex marriage in nine signatory states: 4
1
'a trend is currently emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal
recognition of same sex marriage. In addition, seventeen member states authorise
some form of civil partnership for same-sex couples. As to the specific issue raised
in the present case, the Court considers that the trend emerging in the legal systems
of the Council of Europe member states is clear: of the nineteen States which
authorise some form of registered partnership other than marriage, Lithuania and
Greece are the only ones to reserve it exclusively to different-sex couples. In other
words, with two exceptions, Council of Europe member States, when they opt to
enact legislation introducing a new system of registered partnership as an
alternative to marriage for unmarried couples, includes same-sex couples in its
scope ... '
The case heard before the Grand Chamber was brought by three same-sex
couples and a not-for-profit organisation which provides psychological and
moral support to gays and lesbians, who collectively claimed that Greek Law
No 3719/2008,42 enacted in November 2008 creating the concept of 'civil
unions', a partnership between two adults of different gender, was a violation
of Art 8, taken together with Art 14 of the European Convention of Human
Rights. The judgment of the Grand Chamber provides a very useful
contemporary statement of not only the court's understanding of the evolving
application of Arts 8 and 14, but also a broad analysis of the comparative
European and international law approach to non-marital partnerships within
the legal systems of the Council of Europe. In addition to tracking the updated
position of those states,43 the judgment makes reference to the relatively
progressive views of the Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe.
Specifically Resolution 1728 (2010) adopted on 29 April 2010, entitled
'Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity', calls on
member states to 'ensure legal recognition of same-sex partnerships when
national legislation envisages such recognition, as already recommended by the
Assembly in 2000', by providing, inter alia, for 'the same pecuniary rights and
obligations as those pertaining to different-sex couples; and measures to ensure
"' At para 91.
42 Law no 3719/2008 entitled 'Reforms concerning the family, children and society'.
13 The judgment at part B, paras 25-26 sets what it refers to as the 'Comparative Law material' in
this context as follows: '25 The comparative law material available to the Court on the
introduction of official forms of non-marital partnership within the legal systems of Council of
Europe member States shows that nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) recognise same-sex marriage. In addition,
seventeen member States (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia
Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) authorise some form of civil partnership for
same-sex couples. Denmark, Norway and Sweden recognise the right to same-sex marriage
without at the same time providing for the possibility of entering into a civil partnership.
26. Lastly, Lithuania and Greece are the only Council of Europe countries which provide for a
form of registered partnership designed solely for different-sex couples, as an alternative to
marriage (which is available only to different-sex couples).'
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that, where one partner in a same-sex relationship is foreign, this partner is
accorded the same residence rights as would apply if she or he were in a
heterosexual relationship'. 44
In considering the alleged discriminatory treatment of the applicants, the Grand
Chamber refers to Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 of the Council of Europe
which sets out required measures to combat discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation or gender identity, and notes the recommendation by the
Committee of Ministers that Member States: 45
'1. examine existing legislative and other measures, keep them under review, and
collect and analyse relevant data, in order to monitor and redress any direct or
indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity;
2. ensure that legislative and other measures are adopted and effectively
implemented to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender
identity, to ensure respect for the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender persons and to promote tolerance towards them .... '
The Grand Chamber further noted that Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 also
requires that 4 6
'23. Where national legislation confers rights and obligations on unmarried
couples, member states should ensure that it applies in a non-discriminatory way
to both same-sex and different-sex couples, including with respect to survivor's
pension benefits and tenancy rights.
24. Where national legislation recognises registered same-sex partnerships,
member states should seek to ensure that their legal status and their rights and
obligations are equivalent to those of heterosexual couples in a comparable
situation.
25. Where national legislation does not recognise nor confer rights or obligations
on registered same-sex partnerships and unmarried couples, member states are
invited to consider the possibility of providing, without discrimination of any kind,
including against different sex couples, same-sex couples with legal or other means
to address the practical problems related to the social reality in which they live.'
The position under European Union law was also considered by the Court and
in particular, the commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union in respect of Arts 7, 9 and 21 of the Charter, relating to
discrimination. Article 7 asserts the right to respect for private and family life;4 7
4 Paragraphs 16.9.1 and 169.3 of Resolution 1728 (2010) cited in para 28 of the judgment.
s Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 5 on measures to combat
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, set out in para 29 of the
judgment.
46 Paragraphs 23-25; cited at para 30 of the judgment.
47 'Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and
communications.'
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Art 9 provides a clear statement on the right to marry;48 whilst Art 21 prohibits
discrimination on a lengthy list of grounds. 49 All three articles are cited in full
by the Court in considering the current and potential obligations of EU member
states and, in assessing their impact, the Court was instructed by the
Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
prepared in 2006 by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental
Rights, stating as follows in relation to Art 9:50
'Modern trends and developments in the domestic laws in a number of countries
toward greater openness and acceptance of same-sex couples notwithstanding, a
few states still have public policies and/or regulations that explicitly forbid the
notion that same-sex couples have the right to marry. At present there is very
limited legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the sense that marriage is not
available to same-sex couples. The domestic laws of the majority of states
presuppose, in other words, that the intending spouses are of different sexes.
Nevertheless, in a few countries, e.g., in the Netherlands and in Belgium, marriage
between people of the same sex is legally recognized. Others, like the Nordic
countries, have endorsed a registered partnership legislation, which implies, among
other things, that most provisions concerning marriage, i.e. its legal consequences
such as property distribution, rights of inheritance, etc., are also applicable to these
unions. At the same time it is important to point out that the name "registered
partnership" has intentionally been chosen not to confuse it with marriage and it
has been established as an alternative method of recognizing personal
relationships. This new institution is, consequently, as a rule only accessible to
couples who cannot marry, and the same-sex partnership does not have the same
status and the same benefits as marriage ...
In order to take into account the diversity of domestic regulations on marriage,
Article 9 of the Charter refers to domestic legislation. As it appears from its
formulation, the provision is broader in its scope than the corresponding articles in
other international instruments. Since there is no explicit reference to "men and
women" as the case is in other human rights instruments, it may be argued that
there is no obstacle to recognize same-sex relationships in the context of marriage.
There is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such
marriages. International courts and committees have so far hesitated to extend the
application of the right to marry to same-sex couples.'
Thus at this point of its judgment the Court noted and reiterated the capacity
for signatory states to lawful recognise same-sex marriages through domestic
regimes, but again reiterated the position outlined in Schalk v Kopf and rejected
any suggestion that such marriages must be positively facilitated by domestic
marital laws.
48 'The right to marry and to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national
laws governing the exercise of these rights.'
41 '1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 2.
Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the
Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties,
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.'
so Paragraph 32.
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In considering the merits of the case, the Court outlined the reliance by the
Greek Government on the legitimate aims of Law no 3719/2008, which 'should
be viewed as a set of provisions allowing parents to raise their biological
children in such a way that the father had an equitable share of parental
responsibility without the couple being obliged to marry'. 5 Thus, in limiting
the availability of the union to heterosexual couples, the Greek Government
sought to find other means of stabilising the relationship between heterosexual
parents, in order to better secure both parental and child rights. Intriguingly the
Court demonstrated that 'the Greek legislature had shown itself to be both
traditional and modern in its thinking'; in recognising the societal shift away
from the traditional marital union, and creating an alternative legal framework,
whilst continuing to limit the scope of that statutory-based status and
associated rights solely to heterosexual couples. This motivation, when applied
to the personal situation of the applicant couples, was justified in the
submissions of the Greek Government on the basis 'that the biological
difference between different-sex and same-sex couples, in so far as the latter
could not have biological children together, justified limiting civil unions to
different-sex couples'.5 2 It was argued by the Greek Government that, by no
longer necessitating marriage in order to allow a father to establish paternity
and be involved in his child's life, the limited availability of the civil union
created by the impugned law could not thus be perceived as a violation of
Arts 14 and 8 of the Convention. In their defence it was asserted that same-sex
couples could simply not be regarded as being in a 'similar or comparable
situation to different-sex couples, since they could not in any circumstances
have biological children together'., 3 In light of the fact of legislation on civil
unions in other Council of Europe member states, the Greek Government
added that Law no 3719/2008 differed from similar legislation in those states
and was thus capable of being distinguished legitimately:5 4
'While those laws produced effects with regard to the financial relations between
the parties, only the Greek legislation established a presumption of paternity in
respect of children born in the context of a civil union. The Government concluded
from this that Law no. 3719/2008 focused on the personal ties between the
partners rather than the property-related aspects of their relationship.'
On the first issue, the Court recognised the absence of a dispute regarding
whether the applicants' relationship fell within the notion of 'private life' within
the meaning of Art 8 of the Convention, and noting that, in light of the decision
in Schalk and Kopf v Austria, and 'in view of the rapid evolution in a
considerable number of member States regarding the granting of legal
recognition to same-sex couples, it [would be] artificial to maintain the view
that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple [could not] enjoy
"family life" for the purposes of Article 8'. Consequently the Court was of the
51 Paragraph 82.
52 Paragraph 67.
53 Ibid.
54 Paragraph 68.
55 Paragraph 73, quoting directly from Schalk and Kopf at 94.
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view 'that the applicants' relationships in the present case fall within the notion
of "private life" and that of "family life", just as would the relationships of
different-sex couples in the same situation'. s 6 However, in its judgment the
Court also accepted that the protection of the 'traditional' family 'might justify
a difference in treatment' and accepted that it can be legitimate to 'enact
legislation to regulate the situation of children born outside marriage and also
indirectly strengthen the institution of marriage within Greek society'. Equally
such a distinction in treatment mandates respect for the principle of
proportionality in the circumstances. In assessing this, the Court reaffirmed,
with reference to the decisions in Tyrer v the United KingdomS7 and Goodwin v
United Kingdom,58 that the Convention is a living and evolving document,
subject to progressive interpretations in light of contemporary conditions and
thus the state:5 9
'in its choice of means designed to protect the family and secure respect for family
life as required by Article 8, must necessarily take into account developments in
society and changes in the perception of social and civil-status issues and
relationships, including the fact that there is not just one way or one choice when
it comes to leading one's family or private life.'
Thus the Court emphasised the need for a state to lawfully apply its margin of
appreciation in a manner which reflects the narrow margin afforded to states in
cases arising 'where there is a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual
orientation'. In such cases, relying upon the previous rulings in Karner v
Austria60 and Kozak v Poland,61 it was stated that 'the principle of
proportionality does not merely require the measure chosen to be suitable in
principle for achievement of the aim sought. It must also be shown that it was
necessary, in order to achieve that aim, to exclude certain categories of people -
in this instance persons living in a homosexual relationship - from the scope of
application of the provisions at issue'. 62 Consequently the burden of proof was
placed firmly on the Greek Government to justify the limited availability of civil
union to the residual couples, as reasonably securing the legitimate aims which
they claim to pursue, ie 'to bar same-sex couples from entering into the civil
unions provided for by Law no. 3719/2008'.63
Ultimately the Court was not convinced by the defence presented by the Greek
Government and found in favour of the applicants on both key issues. First the
Court concluded that the Greek Government had failed to justify the 'difference
in treatment arising out of the legislation in question between same-sex and
56 Paragraph 73.
5' 25 April 1978 Series A no 26.
"' Application no 28957/95 ECHR 2002-VI.
59 Paragraph 84, further citing X and Others v Austria [GC] Application no 19010/07
19 February 2013 in support.
60 Application no 40016/98 ECHR 2003-IX.
61 Application no 13102/02 2 March 2010.
62 Paragraph 85.
13 Paragraph 85.
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different-sex couples who are not parents'.6 4 Secondly, the Court declared itself
'not convinced by the Government's argument that the attainment through Law
no. 3719/2008 of the goals to which they refer presupposes excluding same-sex
couples from its scope'. 6s By way of additional comment and notwithstanding
the lack of general consensus among the legal systems of the Council of Europe
Member states on the issue of same-sex marriage, the court expressly
acknowledged that:
'a trend is currently emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal
recognition of same-sex relationships. Nine member States provide for same-sex
marriage. In addition, seventeen member States authorise some form of civil
partnership for same-sex couples ... the Court considers that the trend emerging in
the legal systems of the Council of Europe member States is clear: of the nineteen
States which authorise some form of registered partnership other than marriage,
Lithuania and Greece are the only ones to reserve it exclusively to different-sex
couples .... '
Thus, save for two exceptions, the Court noted that, when choosing to amend
their laws or enact new laws in respect of registered partnership as an
alternative to marriage, the law-makers in the Council of Europe states have
chosen to include same-sex couples in its scope. In the context of what the
Court referred to as a 'gradual evolution', the European Court of Human
Rights concluded that the Greek Government had failed to offer 'convincing
and weighty reasons capable of justifying the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the scope of Law no. 3719/2008'.66
Currently awaiting decision before the European Court of Human Rights are
the cases of Chapin and Charpentier v France,6 7 Ferguson and others v United
Kingdom6 8 and Orlandi and others v Italy.6 9 The case of Chapin and
Charpentier v France centres on the marriage of two men, arising from a civil
ceremony rebelliously conducted by the Mayor of B1gles, in the French
department of Gironde. The union was subsequently declared null and void by
the French Cour de Cassation, where, in line with common law views, it
declared a valid marriage to be the union of one man and one woman. In 2009
the European Court of Human Rights gave notice of the application to the
French Government and declared its intention to put questions to the parties
under Art 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with Art 12 (right
to marriage) and in conjunction with Art 8 (right to respect for private and
family life) of the Convention. However, given that the French law has changed
significantly in the interim and legalised same-sex marriage in 2013, it has been
64 Paragraph 89.
s Paragraph 89.
66 Paragraph 92.
6' Application no 40183/07.
6 Application no 8254/11.
69 Applications no 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 and 60088/12.
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suggested that 'the ECtHR could easily evade the broader issue of the right of
same-sex partners to marry and instead rule on the specific facts of each case'. 70
Somewhat similarly in Ferguson v United Kingdom, pending before the
European Court of Human Rights, the first to eighth applicants seek to
challenge the lawfulness of the (then) non-extension of the right to marry to
same-sex couples, whilst the ninth to sixteenth applicants seek to challenge the
ongoing non-availability to heterosexual couples of the right to register a civil
partnership. They claim on both issues the United Kingdom is in breach of the
parties' right to respect for family life under Art 8 of the Convention. As above
it has been suggested that the fact of the more recent availability of marriage to
same-sex couples in the United Kingdom might permit the Court to evade the
broader issue of the right to marry: 'the ECtHR will at a minimum need to
address whether barring heterosexuals from accessing civil partnerships is
discriminatory.' 71
In Orlandi and Others v Italy notice of the multiple applications received
against Italy was communicated to the Italian Government in 2013, and the
Court similarly put questions to the parties under Art 8 and under Art 14, read
in conjunction with Art 8 and/or Art 12 of the Convention. These cases arose in
the first instance following the refusal by the Italian authorities to register
homosexual marriages which had been lawfully contracted in other
jurisdictions. The 12 applicants, six couples, had entered into marriages in
jurisdictions where such unions were lawfully permitted. Their subsequent
attempts to register the marriages in Italy were refused on the basis that such
unions were contrary to the norms of Italian public order. Specifically in the
matter of Antonio Garullo and Mario Ottocento, one of the six couples
presenting before the European Court of Human Rights, the Rome Court of
Appeal noted that such registration could not take place given that their
marriage lacked one of the essential requisites to amount to the institution of
marriage in the domestic order, namely the different sex of the spouses. 72 In
presenting these cases the applicants have raised the related absence under the
Italian legal system of any other domestic framework for the legal recognition
of a same-sex relationship. In light of the ruling in Vallianatos and others v
Greece, this latter issue in particular may prove difficult for the Italian
Government to refute.
Marriage equality is an issue of significant social and legal importance, yet
quite differing approaches remain evident in Convention signatory states.
Although there is a distinct absence of international consensus on the issue,
these are very much changing times and the legal recognition of what might be
regarded as a non-traditional union is slowly evolving towards the
long-standing norms for opposite-sex unions. A number of the jurisdictions that
70 E Bribosia, I Rorive and L Van den Eynde 'Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before
the European Court of Human Rights in Light of the US Experience' (2014) 32 Berkeley J Int'l
Law 1 at 6.
71 Ibid.
72 Rome Court of Appeal decision of 13 July 2006.
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have sought to maintain a distinction in respect of the status and rights of a
different-sex relationship and that of a same-sex relationship have been
challenged before both national courts and the European Court of Human
Rights to varying levels of success. A related question still unanswered is the
lawfulness of excluding heterosexual couples from the right to access civil
partnerships. This issue continues to develop nationally and at the European
Court of Human Rights with welcome evidence of an increasing acceptance of
the right to equal treatment for all committed couples; thereby respecting and
facilitating their choices in private and family life. The recently developed right
to some form of legal recognition and status continues to move slowly towards
a growing momentum towards a right to marriage for all. The broader case law
centring on the definition and scope of the family under Art 8 equally
demonstrates a capacity and willingness to expand the concept, with a view to
reducing the scope for the exercise of a margin of appreciation and ultimately
influencing all signatory states to favourably develop their governing laws.
